By Lokman Slim and Inga Schei
On June 30, 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) gave the country’s prosecutor general arrest warrants for four Hezbollah members accused of participating in former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri’s assassination. That same day, the newly formed Lebanese government, which owes its existence to a Hezbollah-orchestrated political coup blessed by the organization’s Syrian and Iranian patrons, met with the intention of adopting a policy statement to be submitted to the parliament for a vote of confidence.
It was unsurprising that nothing particularly “theatrical” occurred, as some predicted would happen upon the STL’s release of its indictment. Overall, the three-day parliamentary discussions on the Council of Ministers’ statement brought no real surprises or new dimensions to the ongoing general debate in Lebanon. The fact is, the indictment and the attacks levied in parliament against Hezbollah—for turning Lebanon into a quasi-rogue state that respects neither the UN resolutions nor the international community at large—are ultimately just reactions to Hezbollah’s patient, long-term effort to exert sophisticated control over Lebanon’s territory, administration and
