Review Essay

Terrorism and Insurgency

ROBERT M. CASSIDY

The war on terrorism will have lasted seven years by September 2008, making it

much longer than the American Civil War or World War II. Current American

national security and military strategy documents, in fact, frame this war as a protracted

struggle, one which may see persistent conflict lasting several decades. Despite

the duration of this war, the US government has not yet exhibited a great deal of

perspicacity in identifying and describing it coherently. It has used monikers that

vary from the “Global War on Terrorism” to the “Long War” and “Persistent Conflict.”

These labels may well capture a portion of the enemy’s methodology, or the

longevity of the fight, but they do not provide for a clear understanding of what kind

of war America and its partners are prosecuting. Is it a war, or a struggle, against terrorism?

Or is it a war aimed at countering an insurgency of global scale in which

nonstate, armed groups coalesce and affiliate under the aegis of a radical interpretative

religious ideology, with the stated aim of overthrowing the Westphalian State

system? In the latter sense, does al Qaeda foment no less than a revolution in revolution?

The vast collection of essays contained in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency

in the 21st Century: International Perspectives attempts to answer these

questions as well as many others. Herein lies the value of this multivolume edited

work, as it provides a comprehensive examination of a host of issues and challenges

that continue to make this perennial and irregular war an exceedingly challenging

one.

James Forest is certainly qualified to edit such a massive undertaking. He is

theDirector of Terrorism Studies at the United StatesMilitaryAcademy atWest Point,

where he teaches courses on counterterrorism and information warfare. In this capacity,

he also directs research initiatives for the Combating Terrorism Center at West

Point. In just over 2,000 pages, comprising three volumes, Forest has compiled 60-odd

thematic essays that outline perspectives on insurgency, terrorism, strategy, intelligence,

interagency cooperation, democratization, ideology, and martyrdom. This aggregation

of essays summarizes and distills extant knowledge with the aim of

understanding and learning more regarding terrorism and insurgencies; and how to

better counter them. Portions of this work explore best practices in counterinsurgency

and counterterrorism, while other chapters examine failed methodologies. The first

volume, “Strategic andTacticalConsiderations,” analyzes hard power, soft power, and

intelligence, as well as counterintelligence. The second volume, “Sources and Facilitators,”

examines state failure, border security, democratization, network organiza-

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tions, criminal connections, and root-cause societal factors. The last volume, “Lessons

Learned fromCombating Terrorism and Insurgency,” exploresmyriad historical case

studies on counterterrorism operations, ranging from Beirut to Beslan.

Forest provides a thorough preface and introductory chapter at the beginning

of the first volume that defines the scope, purpose, and framework organizing

this collection of essays. Fighting insurgents and terrorists requires a variety of strategies

and techniques. The editor also notes at the outset that “insurgents can and do

use terrorism, but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actor who may

choose to use terrorism.” In other words, whilemany insurgents employ terrorist tactics

(suicide bombing, for example), not all terrorists are insurgents, per se. The most

insightful and consequential observation in the introduction, however, is Forest’s explanation

of why religious ideologies present a particularly challenging objective to

overcome. First, ideologies based on interpretations or distortions of religion are

founded on theological supremacy; believers presume superiority over nonbelievers,

who are not illumined by the true faith. Second, these ideologies are based on exclusivity

wherein the “true believers” occupy some holy territory and are a chosen

people. Third,many, if notmost, religious ideologies are absolutist in that they do not

tolerate half-heartedness; one is absolutely with the cause and faith, or not. Finally,

only true believers can count on some notion of salvation in the afterlife,whereas the

nonbelieving, or unbelieving, enemies of the cause will ostensibly only meet death

and eternal damnation. In the case of the dogma that al Qaeda and its ilk espouse,

their version of “Islam or death” is the mantra. Such “ideologies” present fictional

yet “polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, light and

dark—values that can be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert a seeker into a

lethal killer.” Based on this insight, Forest observes that defeating alQaeda is largely

about the war within Islam over ideas and souls.

Among the authors in the first volume areMahaAzzam-Nusseibeh,Douglas

A. Borer, James Kiras, Steven Marks, Harvey Rishikof, and James Robbins. They offer

analyses on topics as diverse as democracy, ideology, the law, man-hunting, and

suicide bombing, as they pertain to defeating an insurgency that is founded on an interpretive

Islamist ideology. In one informative chapter, Borer andMichael Freeman examine

strategic thinking and the utility of promoting democracy to defeat terrorism.

Their argument that democratization is probably not an effective counter to terrorism

is fourfold: Democratization will not undermine the fundamental causes of terrorism;

the proliferation of democracies will create more targets for terrorists; democratization

willweaken the response of states; and aworld withmore democraciesmight produce

fewer allieswilling to fight terrorism. The underlying assumption supporting this

argument is that making more democracies in theMiddle East would require coercive

regime change and military occupation, as exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

authors’ rationale is that the presence and occupation by more than 100,000 forces, in

the heartland of Islam, in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example, would be counterproductive

in the fight against radical Islamists as such an action would precipitate more

recruitment of al Qaeda-supporting mujahideen. Borer and Freeman also postulate

that for America and theWest in general, “engaging in the war of ideas within the Islamic

world is an undertaking far more complicated than many people appreciate for

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many reasons.” TheWest does not have the credibility or authority in the Islamic community

to participate even indirectly in Islamic issues. Another reason why western

participation is impractical is that other groups that aremuch better poised to wage the

war of ideas within Islam have also failed. For example, extant Islamic state governments

(Egypt, Jordan, SaudiArabia, etc.) have all tried in varying degrees to counter or

suppress radical Islamists, achieving limited success thus far.

The religious ideology that animates and resonates with those who orchestrate

and execute insurgency and terrorist suicide bombings is what constitutes

the essence and the glue that binds these movements. Two other chapters in the first

volume—“Battlefronts in theWar of Ideas” by Jim Robbins and “The Centrality of

Ideology in Counterterrorism Strategies in the Middle East” by Maha Azzam-

Nusseibeh—complement the analysis by Borer and Freeman. Robbins submits that

religiously animated insurgent and terrorist groups operate inmany ways like similar

groups. Within contemporary Islamist movements religion is instrumentalized

as ideology, serving the same purpose as other more familiar secular frameworks,

such asMarxismor nationalism. The role of religion as ideology is to propagate, recruit,

organize, train, and aspire to operational goals. Like any other revolutionary

dogma, radical Islamism is not just a “description of the world or justification for

specific attacks but a self-sanctifying program of action that helps recruit, motivate,

mobilize, and direct the activities of the group.” It is the principal lens through

which the insurgency communicates its program to the outside world, through violent

acts or information operations.More than anything else, ideology aims to legitimize

the struggle in the minds of the movement and the world audience. The

radicals who wage war against civilization do not include all those who espouse

“salafist” beliefs or proclivities, only those who seek to impose these beliefs on others

through the barrel of a gun. Therefore, Robbins postulates, countering this ideology

should not encompass a broad campaign aimed at every aspect of their belief.

A more efficient approach would focus on junctures and critical nodes within this

ideological schema that are utilized to “transform faith into threat.” The most crucial

ideological nexus may be found in their goal to establish a link between Islam

and violence, in an attempt to employ the former to legitimize the latter.

Azzam-Nusseibeh amplifies the centrality of ideology in the Middle East

by generally comparing the origins and evolution of radical Islamist ideology in two

crucial states from whence the movement emanated: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. His

chapter briefly addresses the principal issue that underpins the ideology fueling terrorism

and insurgency. This igniter, he explains, is the fact that radical Islamist terrorism

has emerged due to “the confluence of a new revolutionary theory combined

with widespread public disaffection toward the state.” The West does not have the

credibility or credentials to seriously influence the ideological battle within Islam.

From a theological standpoint, the principal protagonist that should wage the war of

ideas against radical Islamists is the region’s traditional and orthodox Islamic hierarchy.

The fact that the traditional Islamic establishments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia

are opposed to radical Islamism, as engendered by the likes of al Qaeda, does not imply

that these establishments disagree entirely, or necessarily, with the worldview of

the radicals. Both Islamist extremists and the traditional Islamic clerics reflect the

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worldview and aspirations of the societies from which they hail. Areas of consensus

among radical and orthodox Islam appear to be the need for political reform, the desire

for a greater degree of Islamization, and a demand for a stronger stance in opposition

to Israel and the United States. In other words, the war for Muslim minds and

ideas that Egypt and Saudi Arabia need to wage is not aboutmoving the region closer

to western interests or principles. Essentially, it is about discrediting the Islamists as

a means of mitigating and ultimately eliminating their appeal among the indigenous

populations in the region. “Ultimately, the defeat of terrorism must involve the winning

of the hearts and minds of the religiousmany inMiddle Eastern society, and not

the secular few.” According to the author, Egypt and SaudiArabia have been particularly

successful in countering the radical Islamists’ efforts to legitimize the use of

terror. The irony is, the success of orthodoxy in countering Islamic fundamentalism

has accelerated Islamization of societies in the region, which may also be inimical, if

not violently so, to American interests.

The second volume, “Sources and Facilitators,” generally covers state failure,

border controls, democracy promotion, networks, trafficking, and societal issues.

Bard O’Neill, Donald Alberts, Thomas H. Johnson, and M. Chris Mason are

among its authors. In the chapter titled “Terrorism, Insurgency, and Afghanistan,”

the readerwill find themost cogent and topical contribution of the entire set. Johnson

and Mason lucidly argue that “Afghanistan today is in danger of capsizing in a perfect

storm of insurgency, terrorism, narcotics, and warlords.” The linkages between

these challenges are expanding and self-reinforcing. The resurgent al Qaeda-backed

Taliban are fomenting an increasingly potent insurgency in the south and east of Afghanistan.

The principal sources of this insurgency include corruption, oppression,

poverty, bad governance, and Islamist movements that are metastasizing throughout

Afghanistan and its neighboring countries. The post-Taliban Karzai government has

found it exceedingly difficult to extend itsmandate and control outside the capital of

Kabul and into Afghanistan’s vast and austere hinterlands. The most pernicious aspect,

and a crucial cause for the steady regeneration and growth in insurgent capacity,

the authors explain, is thatOsama bin Laden,most of the high-ranking alQaeda leadership,

and a preponderance of the Taliban senior cadre have been afforded relatively

unimpeded sanctuary in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas across

the border in Pakistan. Johnson and Mason maintain that this grave situation

evolved, in part, as a result of the US government decision in mid-November 2001,

during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, to allow the Pakistani Air

Force to transport hundreds of Pakistanis from the then-encircled northern city of

Konduz. This evacuation “turned into a mass extraction of senior Taliban and al

Qaeda personnel, dubbed Operation EvilAirlift” by appalled Special Forces soldiers

on the scene. The following month the United States failed to commit American

ground forces to block the escape route of al Qaeda from Tora Bora, allowing bin

Laden and several dozen of his senior leaders to escape a potential encirclement,

fleeing into Pakistan, where they remain. No counterinsurgency has ever succeeded

by affording the insurgents cross-border sanctuary. This film has played before, in

Vietnam, Cambodia, and with the Soviets in the same nether regions of the Afghanistan-

Pakistan border. None of these ended well. The wild and unregulated tribal ar-

132 Parameters

eas on Pakistan’s northern border remain an increasingly grave impediment to any

chance of success in Afghanistan. The consequences of failure, however, are graver

still.

Volume 3, “Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency,”

includes a host of case studies on counterterrorism operations dating back to the

1980s. JimRobbins, TomSherlock, and RickWrona are among the authorswho offer

themost illuminating chapters. Robbins and Sherlock analyze the wars in Chechnya,

andWrona offers a chapter on Hezbollah, a typically understated but genuinely perfidious

and formidable terrorist organization with state sponsorship and global

reach.

In the aggregate, this multivolume set does indeed contribute to the corpus

of knowledge that informs how we counter terrorism and insurgency in the

twenty-first century. The majority of the essays are well-researched, well-written,

and germane. One can find more than a few insights on what this war is about, the

enemy’s ideology and networks, and what needs to be done to effectively prosecute

this long, irregular, and Manichean struggle. Plowing through all three volumes

and 2,000-plus pages of this edited work does require more resilience than the typical

reader should be expected to exhibit if one is to get “the most juice for the

squeeze.” This reviewer recommends the three volumes for the reference shelves in

academic institutions, or for institutions that have security or policy as their purview.

I do not, though, recommend these books for personal reading enjoyment. If it

were possible to purchase or acquire individual volumes fromthe set, the quality of

each volume coincides numerically; the first being the best and most salient. Volume

1 answers questions, raises questions, and generally stimulates thought on

how to frame this war. Volume 2 is a close second in quality and includes the single

best and most relevant essay of the entire work—“Terrorism, Insurgency, and Afghanistan”

by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Forest, James J. F., ed. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives

(3 Volumes). Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007.

The Reviewer: Lieutenant Colonel RobertM. Cassidy is a US Army officer, nonresident

Fellow with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, and member of the Royal

United Services Institute.

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