In mid-March, the Arab Spring finally reached Syria, despite assessments by both the regime and many international experts suggesting that Syria was somehow an “exception” to the rule of Arab autocracies that had fallen previously. The regime immediately responded with a brutal campaign of repression—ongoing today—that is interspersed with sporadic efforts at engaging in so-called national dialogue. The opposition has meanwhile been maintaining pressure on the regime internally through sustained street protest and other forms of civil disobedience and externally by attempts to mobilize the international community to isolate and apply punitive sanctions against it. Both regime and opposition however are acutely aware of the increasingly important role that Syria’s neighbor Turkey is able to play as events continue to unfold.
Initially, Turkey was willing to refrain from criticising the Asad regime even as events were unfolding in Jisr al-Shughour and Idlib in June. This was in no small part due to the fact that Prime Minister Erdogan believed that he could persuade Asad to institute the necessary reforms and avert further violence that would ultimately destabilize the country to a point of no return. A collapse into civil war would have serious consequences not only for Syria, but for its neighbors and, in particular, Turkey.
By August, however, it became very clear to the Turkish authorities that such persuasion would not be possible. The Syrian regime, from a Turkish perspective, appeared unable or unwilling to either halt the violence against its population or institute meaningful reforms, resulting in a dramatic shift in Turkey’s policy. Erdogan went on record calling Asad a liar and stated that he must step down and that there would be no further engagement with the Syrian regime. Reengagement remains a possibility, contingent on a change of heart on the part of Asad.
Well aware of Turkey’s strategically important role, the Syrian opposition has relied in part on a strategy that attempts to draw Turkey into the fray. There are three distinct roles in which Turkey will likely find itself on behalf of the opposition: First, to continue to provide shelter for the increasing number of Syrian refugees, particularly the families of army deserters and defected members of the regime; second, to continue to provide cover and permission for the various opposition groups to meet, organize, and attempt to coalesce (the Syrian National Council was recently announced in Istanbul, the latest in a long line of meetings, conferences and councils all hosted on Turkish soil); or third, and perhaps most important, the eventual military intervention by Turkish forces to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe should a city like Aleppo rise up, leading the Asad regime to take punitive action against it on the scale seen in Hama, Deraa and other Syrian cities. The creation of a safe haven by Turkey to protect civilians would then open the door to a long-awaited “Benghazi scenario.”
For both the Syrian regime and Turkey, the Benghazi scenario is probably the most grave, and something for which Turkey would do well to prepare contingency plans. In this scenario, the city of Aleppo would finally reach critical mass in its anti-regime protests, causing the Syrian regime to carry out a punitive reprisal campaign against the city in a manner similar to that seen in Hama, Homs, Deraa, and Deir al-Zour, otherwise protests would likely spread to Damascus and all would be lost for the regime. The main difference, however, is that unlike the other cities, Aleppo is very close to the Turkish border. The last time such an attack occurred in a city this close to the border, in Jisr al-Shughour, it generated 10,000 refugees. The population of Jisr al-Shughour is about 30,000 while Aleppo has a population of about 5 million. Any attack on Aleppo could cause an overwhelming number of refugees to pour across the borders into Turkey.
Should this turn of events become an actuality, the Turkish authorities will be obliged to either allow for a massive influx of refugees across Turkish borders or move in to create a safe haven around Aleppo, thus paving the way for the “Benghazi scenario.” It is fear of the latter option that has prompted the Syrian regime to dedicate a great deal of time and resources to Aleppo. Their efforts include a massive security presence, persuasion and intimidation—both direct and indirect—as well as making examples of other cities like Hama, Deir al-Zour, Abu Kamal, and, most recently, al-Rastan. Such efforts have managed to prevent any major protests or upheavals from occurring in Aleppo thus far. Recent events, however, indicate that the situation is on the brink of imminent change.
