INTRODUCTION

One of the clearest aspects of the post-Cold War era is the rise of religion as a social and political movement around the globe, and, by extension, the growing number of religiously-driven conflicts. This trend appears to be more evident in the Middle East, although it is not limited to this particular region. The secular governments in the Middle East have been frequently challenged, sometimes quite seriously, by Islamist oppositions that want to establish a state based on religious rules. The clash between government forces and militant Islamists often resulted in severe casualties, in which many innocent people, foreigners, as well as fighting sides themselves became victims.

In order to manage religious opposition and cope with its conflict-prone effects, it is necessary to understand the nature of such opposition. Algeria offers a valuable case study, since although the country--unlike many Middle Eastern countries--has no tradition of early Islamic revivalism, the secular government was seriously challenged by political Islamism in the 1990s and only survived with the help of the military. Subsequently, violent clashes lasting about a decade erupted, as a result of which the Algerian people suffered. Though the violence evidently decreased from 2002 and on, the conflict between the secularists and Islamists has continued to some extent.

This article will start with brief background information regarding the roots of the religious opposition in Algeria. Then, through use of historical analysis, it will focus on the twentieth century Islamic revivalism, discussing the factors and conditions that gave rise to the Islamist challenge. Based on the evaluations, the concluding section will also address the implications of the findings for conflict management.

ALGERIA AND RELIGION IN COLONIAL YEARS

A glance at the history of Algeria suggests that the country has no deep-rooted history as a political entity. The country was molded largely by France in the nineteenth century to suit its colonial purposes.[1] The colonization of Algeria was both long (1831-1962) and intense in that the ultimate objective was the assimilation and incorporation of the country as an integral part of France. This was to be achieved by “Frenchifying” the country, casting Algeria in the image of France culturally, linguistically, and even demographically (through the proliferation of the French settlements). French influences were thoroughly woven into the fabric of the society, diluting indigenous culture and identity. It is interesting that as recently as the 1970s, more than 60 percent of Algerians could not read Arabic, their native language.[2]

As a result of this powerful colonial legacy, a European-like secular culture developed and became predominant, particularly in the urban areas. Islam, on the other hand, remained essentially marginal in public life, confined to the rural Sufi orders and to the few urban-based networks of the ulama (Muslim scholars), dealing mainly with religious issues, more often moral. Certainly, the French would not have tolerated any form of Islamic revivalism that might have threatened their rule. In general, however, Islam was largely devoid of a dynamic activist spirit throughout much of the colonial period.[3]

The one exception to Islamic dormancy was the establishment of the Association of the Algerian Ulama under the leadership of Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis in May 1931. In its founding articles, the association described itself as “an association for moral education” and stated as one of its primary aims the fight against the “social scourges” of “alcoholism, gambling, and ignorance.”[4] Basically reformist, the initial objective of the association was to deliver Islam from the perceived polluted and corrupt innovations of the Sufis through a cultural and educational revival, with its emphasis on the original sources and the ways of al-salaf, the pious ancestors of early Islam. Later on, the movement began to address the whole issue of French colonial rule and became more involved in the inceptive nationalist demands for equal rights and preservation of a distinctive Muslim identity. It clearly rejected the notion that Algerian Muslims could become Frenchmen.[5] Accordingly, the French rule met its first challenger, albeit at the cultural level.

Although the Ben Badis movement has no tradition of political activity, its message laid the foundation of an Algerian national Muslim consciousness and identity that would give stimulus to the revolution in 1954, which, in turn, initiated the war of independence (1954-1962). As the revolutionary momentum swept the country, Ben Badis’ reform movement became constituent part of the wartime National Liberation Front (FLN), and by 1956, it was entirely subsumed. The paramount position of the FLN, with its predominantly secularist-modernist orientation, established the supremacy of the mostly French-educated secular leaders and the subordination of the ulama. The FLN looked upon Islam simply as one significant element of national and cultural identity. Its stance was far from a commitment to religion.[6]

Accordingly, the emergent nationalist movement was not really a religious revivalist force; rather, it was an anti-colonial movement...

*Dr. Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz is a professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at Balikesir University, Bandirma Economics and Administrative Sciences Faculty, Bandirma, Balikesir, Turkey. He graduated from Ankara University in 1994, completed his M.A. in International Politics from the American University, Washington, D.C. in 1998, and earned his Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, Fairfax, VA in 2002. He taught Introduction to Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. He has been at Balikesir University since 2003, teaching Political History, Ethnic Conflicts, and Conflict Resolution. His research interests particularly include ethnic and religious conflicts.